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Abstract 
We study the effect of ownership structure on the informativeness of a firm’s earnings as 
capitalized in stock prices and returns. We hypothesize that informativeness of earnings is 
decreasing in dual class ownership structure due to purported higher agency costs at dual 
class firms compared to their single class counterparts even though dual class firms have 
relatively higher accrual quality. We find evidence, consistent with our expectations, that 
investors care more about agency costs than the quality of accruals in evaluating the 
earnings of dual class firms. Specifically, we find that current annual returns of the firm are 
negatively associated with dual class ownership structure and that earnings informativeness 
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Despite their prominence around the world, only six percent of companies in the United 
States have a dual class ownership structure.1 Under this ownership scheme, a firm issues 
multiple classes of stock (hereafter firms issuing multiple classes of stock are referred to as 
dual class firms while firms issuing only single class of stock are referred to as single class 
firms) with differential voting and cash flow rights. For example, one class of stock might 
have ten votes per share compared to only one vote per share for the other class of stock. This 
structure results in superior voting rights for one class of shareholders vis-à-vis the other 
class. Typically, shares with superior voting rights are offered to the founders, their families, 
and the executives of the company. Shares with inferior voting rights, on the other hand, are 
sold to the general public. For example, after a recent stock split in April 2014, Google 
Incorporation has three classes of common stock outstanding. Class A share of Google has 
only one vote per share, Class B has ten votes per shares and Class C has no voting rights. 
Class B share with superior voting rights is not traded publicly and is owned by Google 
insiders only, controlling about 56% of the votes.  
It can be argued that since dual class firm managers hold a majority of voting rights, it is 
virtually impossible to remove them. Single class firm managers, on the other hand, can easily 
be removed due to poor performance of the firm or if they take actions that are not optimal in 
the eyes of the stockholders. Accordingly, it is argued that single class firm managers will be 
more likely to “manage” earnings to meet or beat expected earnings forecasts than dual class 
firm managers who lack this motivation as they do not have similar control concerns. This 
argument would imply better quality of accruals at dual class firms (and less earnings 
management) relative to accrual quality at single class firms.  Recent studies by Nguyen and 
Xu (2010), and Arugaslan et al. (2014) indicate that this is in fact the case. Dual class firms 
have relatively better accrual quality than single class firms. Better quality of accruals would 
help reduce the information asymmetry and increase the informativeness of reported earnings 
as well as improve the predictability of future earnings.  
Dual class firms are also believed to have greater agency problems than single class 
firms. Finance theory states that entrenched insiders at dual class firms suffer 
disproportionately lower economic losses as a consequence of their sub-optimal decisions 
resulting in greater agency problems. Increased agency costs stem from higher information 
asymmetry and also imply that there would be a reduction in the informativeness of earnings. 
                                                          
We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick for generously sharing their data on dual-class 
companies. 
 
1 Gompers et al. (2009) report that 6 percent of all Compustat firms  have dual-class ownership 
structure. 
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Evidence from prior research also confirms higher rates of agency problems at firms with 
multiple classes of stock as compared to firms with only one class of stock (Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick, 2010; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2009).     
Theory predicts a negative association between agency costs and earnings 
informativeness in contrast to a positive association between accrual quality and earnings 
informativeness. A special case of dual class firms helps us in determining what is valued 
more by the investors – greater agency costs of dual class firms or the higher accrual quality 
compared to single class firms. Dual class firms are purported to have relatively higher 
agency conflicts (costs) but better accrual quality than the single class firms.  
In this study we examine the effect of ownership structure on the stock market’s valuation 
of a firm’s earnings as captured by earnings response coefficients (ERCs). To do this we 
examine the effect of ownership structure on the ERC of prior, current and future earnings of 
sample firms. Since the accrual quality of dual-class firms is better than the accrual quality of 
single class firms, it is possible that their earnings are relatively more informative to investors 
and viewed positively by them. On the other hand, we also believe that agency costs affect the 
overall information environment of the firm and therefore, should be considered to be more 
important by investors when valuing the firm’s equity. Our results confirm that investors put 
more weight on higher agency costs and therefore, ERCs of our sample firms are decreasing 
in the dual class ownership structure.  
We also examine the effect of divergence between insider voting rights and insider cash 
flow rights on the ERCs. We predict that firms with greater divergence between insider voting 
rights and cash flow rights relatively have higher agency costs and therefore, will experience 
reduced informativeness of earnings as reflected in earnings-returns association. We find 
weak evidence in support of this prediction. Firms with greater divergence have lower ERCs.  
Overall, in this paper, we study the ERCs to test whether investors put relatively more 
weight on potential agency costs or on better accrual quality when valuing dual class 
companies. To our knowledge, this is the first study to do so. By analyzing the effect of 
ownership structure on the determination of ERCs, we not only contribute to the literature on 
the valuation of dual class companies, but also shed light on the earnings response process of 
the investors.  
The results of this study help us explain why such multiple class ownership structure is 
not prevalent in the United States. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
summarizes the relevant literature and motivates the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
earnings responsiveness measure used in the study and section 4 provides the sample 
selection process and descriptive statistics of the data. Section 5 discusses the methodology 
used to test the hypotheses and also presents test results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Ownership Structure and Firm Valuation 
Corporate governance literature consists of a heated debate on the optimal ownership 
structure. Some researchers maintain that dual class shares encourage investment in firm-
specific human capital and overall innovative activity (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), 
Taylor and Whittred (1998)). Others argue that insiders should maintain control if it is costly 
to communicate information about investment opportunities or managerial performance to 
outside investors (Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Fama and Jensen (1983)). Consistent with 
these arguments, Chemmanur and Yawen (2012) show that dual class capital structure would 
be optimal for talented managers with high near-term uncertainty projects. 
On the contrary, starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) many researchers have argued 
that an ownership structure that entrenches managers will result in higher potential agency 
problems. Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) analyze security-voting 
structures theoretically and show that one share-one vote not only makes sure that the best 
management team is chosen but also maximizes firm value when only one of the parties in a 
control contest has significant private benefits of control. 
Consistent with agency cost literature, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) and Dann and 
DeAngelo (1988) report evidence that U.S. dual class recapitalizations are received poorly by 
the investors. Similarly, Jog, Srivastava, and Panangipalli (1996) and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1994) document that operating performance is worse following dual class recapitalizations in 
Canada and US.  
More recently, Gompers et al. (2010) analyze the characteristics of a comprehensive 
sample of dual-class firms in the U.S. They find a negative relationship between insiders’ 
voting rights and firm value, and a positive relationship between insiders’ cash flow rights 
and firm value. The difference between insiders’ voting rights and cash flow rights, the 
wedge, also has a negative impact on firm value. Their results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that dual class companies are more prone to moral hazard problems and higher 
agency costs. They conclude that dual class insiders value private benefits of control a lot 
more than the losses they suffer along with the remaining shareholders as a result of their 
poor decisions. Subsequently, Masulis et al. (2009) analyze the relationship between the 
wedge and private benefits of control. They find that larger wedge decreases the value of 
corporate cash holdings to outside investors, increases CEO compensation and the destruction 
of shareholder value vis-à-vis empire-building acquisitions and expenditures. Greater agency 
problems at dual class firms may cause higher information asymmetry and decrease the 
informativeness of earnings. Additionally, higher information asymmetry often leads to 
higher cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000, Herrmann and Saini, 
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2013). From this we can infer that dual class firms have higher agency costs and greater 
information asymmetry relative to single class firms and, therefore, have relatively less 
informative and predictable earnings.  
On the other hand, Nguyen and Xu (2010) and Arugaslan et al. (2014) find that dual class 
firms relative to single class firms have better accrual quality and tend to have less earnings 
management. Theory on estimation risk predicts lower forward-looking betas for the firms 
with better earnings quality which results in lowering the cost of equity of such firms (Klein 
and Bawa, 1976; Ogneva, 2012). Evidence from prior research suggests that higher accrual 
quality results in better valuation of firms, lower information risks and lower cost of equity 
capital (Francis et al., 2005; Core et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009). Ogneva (2012) concludes 
that the accrual quality of a firm is a priced risk factor as reflected in the realized returns. 
From this we can infer that dual-class firms have better accrual quality which results in 
increased informativeness and predictability of earnings relative to single class firms.  
2.2. Earnings Informativeness 
Ever since the seminal study by Ball and Brown (1968), extant research has focused on 
the relationship between earnings and returns. For example, Easton and Harris (1991) find 
that earnings level and earnings changes simultaneously explain the annual returns. Warfield 
and Wild (1992) provide the evidence that accounting recognition of economic events affects 
the power of returns-earnings association. Likewise, Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan 
(1994) explain the low contemporaneous returns-earnings association found in prior research. 
They include future earnings variables and observe a substantial increase in the explanatory 
power of earnings with respect to current returns. Their results show that the lack of 
timeliness on the part of the accounting system is the reason for the low contemporaneous 
association. Overall, we can state that quality of accounting disclosures affects information 
environment of the firm and therefore, affects the association between returns and earnings. 
The paper that is most relevant to our study is by Lundholm and Myers (2002) (hereafter 
LM). They investigate the extent to which firm disclosure activity affects the relationship 
between returns and earnings and find that corporate disclosure ratings are positively related 
to the amount of variation in current returns that are explained by future earnings news. They 
also report that past earnings are significant in explaining current returns for only firms with 
low levels of disclosure. The authors argue that firms make up for the lack of timeliness of 
current earnings by increasing their disclosure activity. Ettredge, Kwon, Smith, and Zarowin 
(2005, hereafter EKSZ) focus on the effect of SFAS 131 segment disclosure on the forward 
earnings response coefficient in the returns-earnings association. They follow the same 
regression model as LM (2002), but they use segment disclosure pre- and post- SFAS 131 as 
their disclosure metric rather than AIMR analysts’ ratings. Our model is also based on a 
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similar regression model with the ownership structure being tested as having an effect on 
returns-earnings association.   
In summary, prior studies on effects of ownership structure and earnings informativeness 
suggest the following – firstly, the ownership structure is associated with agency costs as well 
as accrual quality. Specifically dual class firms have relatively greater agency costs but also 
have relatively better accrual quality than single class firms. Secondly, agency costs and 
accrual quality both affect the information environment of the firm. Greater agency costs 
result in poor information environment while higher accrual quality results in better 
information environment. Thirdly, the quality of information environment is related to the 
informativeness and predictability of the earnings. Specifically, a poor information 
environment (greater agency costs) deteriorates the informativeness of earnings while a better 
information environment (better accrual quality) improves the informativeness of earnings. 
Investors’ valuation of the firm puts a price on both the agency costs and the accrual quality 
of the firm. These conclusions lead us to an interesting question of what is valued more by the 
investors – the agency costs or the accrual quality of a firm?.  
We expect that agency costs affect the overall information environment of the firm and 
hence are more dominant in the valuation of earnings. We hypothesize that with increase in 
agency costs, the informativeness of earnings will go down as reflected in returns of the firm. 
Hence, our three hypotheses based on the earnings-returns regression model in LM (2002) are 
as follows:  
H1a: Future earnings response coefficient (FERC) is decreasing in dual class 
ownership structure,   
H1b: Contemporaneous earnings response coefficient is decreasing in dual class 
ownership structure.  
H1c: Prior period earnings response coefficient is decreasing in dual class ownership 
structure.  
As discussed earlier, Masulis et al. (2009) find greater agency problems at the firms with 
greater divergence between insiders’ voting rights and cash flow rights as measured by 
WEDGE. Following them we further hypothesize that firms with greater divergence between 
insiders’ voting rights and cash flow rights (higher WEDGE) will experience reduced 
informativeness of earnings. 
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3. Sample and Data 
We document our sample selection process in Table 1. We begin with a total of 15,360 
firms (92,240 firm-years) for the period 1994-20022 covered on Compustat-CRSP merged 
database. From this we delete 5,855 firms for which earnings or returns data is missing. We 
further truncate the data for earnings and returns at 1 percent and 99 percent that leads to 
deletion of 316 firms (3,771 firm-years). Finally, we delete 1,197 firms that reported merger, 
acquisition, or divestiture during 1994-2002.3 All firms on final sample are classified as either 
dual-class or single class. Dual-class firms include all firms with multi classes of stock. Our 
final sample includes 448 dual-class firms (1,685 firm-years) and 7,728 single-class firms 
(29,176 firm-years).  
------------------------Insert Table 1 here------------------------- 
3.1. Descriptives and Variable Definitions 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of our sample disaggregated into dual class sample 
and single class sample in panel A and B respectively. We also test for difference in means 
between dual class sample and single class sample. Results in panel A and B show that dual 
class firms have higher level of earnings in all periods (Et-1, Et, and Et+1) compared to their 
single class counterparts. The t-test of difference in means shows that mean earnings of dual 
class firms are significantly different (higher) than earnings of single class firms in all 
periods. Also, we find that returns (Rt and Rt+1) of dual class firms are significantly different 
(lower) than returns of single class firms. In addition, we also compare the average asset size 
(SIZE) and market-to-book ratio (MKT2BK) of the two sample firms. We find that on average 
dual class firms are significantly larger than single class firms based on asset size. On the 
contrary, dual class firms have significantly lower market-to-book ratio than single class 
firms.  We also find that mean (median) divergence of insider voting rights over insider cash 
flow rights (as measured by WEDGE4) for dual class sample5 is 0.2293 (0.2159).  
------------------------Insert Table 2 here------------------------- 
All the variables used in the study have been defined in the Exhibit 1. We use the GIM 
(2009) data to determine variables IVOTE, ICF and WEDGE where, IVOTE and ICF measure 
the insider control of voting rights and cash flow rights of the firm respectively. WEDGE 
measures the divergence in insider voting and cash flow rights.  
------------------------Insert Exhibit 1 here------------------------- 
 
                                                          
2 We use the Gompers et al. (2009) dual class firm sample extending over the period 1994-2002.  
3 Following EKSZ (2005), we use Compustat annual data item “AQC” and “DO” to identify firms that 
experienced structural changes during the data year.  
4 Refer to Exhibit 1 for variable definition. 
5 By definition WEDGE = 0 for all single class firms. 
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4. Methodology and Results 
We measure the informativeness and predictability of earnings by regressing earnings 
over current period returns for estimating the earnings response coefficient of prior period, 
current period and future period earnings. Our measure of earnings informativeness and 
predictability is based on Collins et al. (1994) model as modified by LM (2002) which 
reflects how much information about earnings (past, current, and future) is capitalized into 
stock price (EKSZ, 2005). LM estimate the levels form of the following regression:6  
              𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 +  𝜀𝑡                                                  (1) 
where, 
Rt is annual stock return measured over the period beginning nine months prior to fiscal 
year end and ending three months after fiscal year end. Et-1, Et and Et+1 represent scaled 
earnings available to common shareholders during prior period, current period, and realized 
next period.7 
Coefficient α1 is response coefficient of prior period earnings and hypothesized to be 
negative. α2 is contemporaneous earnings response coefficient and hypothesized to be 
positive. α3 is future earnings response coefficients and hypothesized to be positive as well. 
Future period return (Rt+1) is also included in the model to mitigate the errors-in-variables bias 
which is introduced due to the inclusion of actual future earnings as an explanatory variable 
of current period returns (Collins et al., 1994; EKSZ, 2005).  
We start with estimation of equation (1) to determine the earnings response coefficients 
on past, contemporaneous and future earnings. The results of estimation are reported in Table 
3. These results are consistent with prior research. Using the sample of all firms, we find that 
prior period earnings as well as actual future returns are negatively (significantly) associated 
with current returns. While contemporaneous earnings and future earnings are positively 
(significantly) associated with current returns. We also test model (1) separately for dual class 
firms sample and single class firms sample and find similar results. However, the absolute 
size of the regression coefficients was smaller for dual class firms sample compared to the 
single class sample regression. This result provides us the initial indication that earnings 
informativeness as reflected by earnings response coefficient(s) is decreasing in dual 
ownership structure which may be due to the higher agency costs prevailing at such firms. To 
test the effect of information environment on earnings informativeness, we re-estimate 
equation (1) after dividing our all firm sample into samples of small and large firms.8 
                                                          
6 LM (2002) also include future earnings and returns for periods (t+2) and (t+3). For parsimony 
reasons, following EKSZ (2005), we only include earnings and returns for one future period, (t+1). 
7 Refer to Exhibit 1 for variable definitions. 
8 Larger firms in general have better disclosures and higher analyst following thereby better 
information environment compared to their smaller counterparts. 
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Following EKSZ (2005), we define large firms as those that have revenues of at least $20 
million in a sample year and smaller firms as those with revenues less than $20 million in any 
sample year. These results are also reported in Table 3. Larger firms have bigger (absolute 
size) earnings response coefficients than small firms. Specifically, future earnings response 
coefficient is large and significant for large firms while it small and insignificant in case of 
small firms. This indicates that future earnings information is embedded in current returns of 
firms with better information environment only.  
 ------------------------Insert Table 3 here------------------------- 
Our goal is to examine the effect of ownership structure on the informativeness and 
predictability of the earnings. Therefore, next, we estimate equation (1) using pooled data of 
dual-class and single-class firms while controlling for the ownership structure and test for the 
effect of ownership structure on the informativeness of the earnings. For this, we add to 
equation (1) an indicator variable (DUAL) indicating the ownership structure of the sample 
firm and the interaction terms for the interaction of prior period, current period and future 
earnings with the type of ownership structure. This results in estimation of following two 
regression equations: 
          𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽0𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽1(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗  𝐸𝑡−1)  
                        + 𝛽2(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) + 𝛽4(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡                     (2)  
where, 
DUAL = 1 if sample firm is a dual class firm during the sample year; and = 0 if 
otherwise. Returns and earnings variables are defined as earlier in equation (1).  
We estimate equation (2) in order to test the effect of dual class ownership structure on 
the earnings response coefficients. Specifically, we estimate equation (2) to test hypotheses 
H1a, H1b and H1c. This helps us to determine if dual-class ownership structure mitigates the 
informativeness of earnings as capitalized in stock prices (current annual returns). In this 
equation we are interested in interaction of DUAL with three earnings variables, namely, Et-1, 
Et and Et+1. If the coefficients on the three interaction terms (β1, β2 and β3) are significant and 
opposite in sign to that of the coefficients on the three individual earnings variables (α1, α2 
and α3) respectively, then we can conclude that dual class ownership structure has a 
mitigating effect on the informativeness of the earnings. Results are shown in Table 4. With 
all firms data, we find that coefficient on future earnings (Et+1) is positive and significant 
confirming the positive association between future earnings and current returns. However, the 
coefficient on the interaction term (DUAL * Et+1) is negative and significant. This result 
supports our hypothesis H2a that the positive association between future earnings and current 
returns is mitigated due to dual class ownership structure. Therefore, we can conclude that 
future earnings response coefficient indicating the informativeness and predictability of future 
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earnings is decreasing in dual class ownership structure. If the sample is disaggregated into 
small and large firms based on revenue, we find that this result is stronger and significant for 
large firms but not for small firms.  
------------------------Insert Table 4 here------------------------- 
Similarly, we also find that for all firms current earnings (Et) have a positive and 
significant association with current returns consistent with prior literature. However this 
association is mitigated due to dual class ownership structure because the coefficient (-
0.1911) on interaction term (DUAL * Et) is negative but not significant (p-value = 0.1448). 
Therefore, we don’t find significant support for our hypothesis H2b that informativeness of 
current earnings is decreasing in dual class ownerships structure. After disaggregating the 
sample into small and large firms based on revenue, we find that the coefficient on interaction 
term is significant (p-value = 0.0865) for small firms sample but not for large firms sample 
(p-value = 0.1612). From this we can conclude that small firms with dual class ownership 
structure experience a decrease in informativeness of contemporaneous earnings.  
We also check for effect of ownership structure on the informativeness of prior period 
earnings. Using all firms sample we find the support in favor of hypothesis H2c. The 
coefficient on Et-1 is negative and significant (p-value < .0001) while the coefficient on the 
interaction term (DUAL * Et-1) is positive and marginally significant (p-value = 0.0890). 
Therefore, we can conclude that the informativeness of prior period earnings is decreasing in 
dual class ownership structure.  
Overall, from results of equation (2) we can conclude that earnings informativeness is 
decreasing (rather than increasing) in dual class ownership structure. This can be attributed to 
the higher agency costs prevailing at the firms with dual class ownership structure. Dual class 
firms have higher accrual quality compared to their single class counterparts but it does not 
help increase the informativeness of earnings. In other words, higher accrual quality does not 
result in higher returns when the agency costs at a firm are high. 
5. Additional Tests 
In previous section we show that ERCs are decreasing in the dual class ownership 
structure. In this section, we do some additional tests by varying our main model. Firstly, we 
control for the divergence between insiders’ voting rights and cash flow rights. Later we also 
control for firm characteristics that affect the timeliness, variability and predictability of the 
earnings and therefore, may affect the returns of the firm.  
5.1 Divergence of Insiders’ Voting Rights and Cash Flow Rights 
Greater divergence of insiders’ voting and cash flow rights as measured by excess of 
insiders’ voting rights over the cash flow rights (WEDGE) is associated with higher agency 
conflicts (Masulis et al., 2009) but is also associated with higher accrual quality (Nguyen and 
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Xu, 2010). Therefore, we further test for the effect of divergence in voting and cash flow 
rights of the insiders on the earnings informativeness using the dual class sample. Specifically 
we use following model to test this effect: 
      𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 +  𝛽0𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽1(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡−1)      
           + 𝛽2(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) + 𝛽4(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡                    (3)  
 
where all variables are defined as in equation (1) and (2) and WEDGE is defined as excess of 
insiders’ voting rights over the insiders’ cash flow rights.   
Results of estimation of equation (3) are reported in table 5. Using all firms sample we 
find that informativeness of prior period earnings (Et-1) and contemporaneous earnings (Et) is 
decreasing in excess of insiders’ voting and cash flow rights. Coefficient on Et-1 is negative 
and significant (p-value < .0001) while coefficient on the interaction term (WEDGE * Et-1) is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.0143) indicating that negative association between prior 
period earnings and current annual returns is decreasing in greater divergence of insiders’ 
voting and cash flow rights. Similarly, coefficient on Et is positive and significant (p-value < 
.0001) while coefficient on the interaction term  (WEDGE * Et) is negative and marginally 
significant (p-value = 0.0910) indicating that positive association between current earnings 
and current annual returns is decreasing in the divergence of insiders’ voting and cash flow 
rights. We do not find any significance on the effect of WEDGE on informativeness of future 
earnings of the firm. The coefficient on the interaction term (WEDGE * Et+1) is negative (as 
expected) but not statistically significant (p-value = 0.3482). Within the dual-class sample we 
do not find any significant effect of WEDGE on the informativeness of earnings in all periods. 
Overall, these results provide marginal support to the hypothesis that investors weigh in the 
higher agency costs more than the higher accrual quality at dual class firms in pricing the 
stock.  
We further analyze the effect of insiders’ voting rights and insiders’ cash flow rights on 
the association between earnings and returns. Specifically, we estimate following equation (5) 
using the dual class sample firms only: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 +  𝛽0𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡−1) +
  𝛽2(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗  𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝛾0𝐼𝐶𝐹 + 𝛾1(𝐼𝐶𝐹 ∗
             𝐸𝑡−1) + 𝛾2(𝐼𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛾3(𝐼𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) +
       𝜀𝑡                                                                                               (4)  
These results are reported in table 6. We don’t find any significant effect of insider voting 
and cash flow rights on the association between earnings and returns except the marginal 
decreasing effect of insiders’ voting rights on the association between prior period earnings 
and returns (p-value = 0.0984).  
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and  
Social Sciences (GB14Mumbai Conference) Mumbai, India. 19-21 December 2014 
ISBN: 978-1-941505-21-2 Paper ID: MF455 
 
- 12 - 
www.globalbizresearch.org 
 
------------------------Insert Table 6 here------------------------- 
 
5.2 Effects of Firm Characteristics 
Prior literature shows that several firm characteristics like growth, risk, earnings 
persistence, information environment and presence of an accounting loss are related to the 
ERC (LM, 2002). These factors affect the association between returns and earnings by 
influencing the timeliness, variability and predictability of earnings. For example, when 
earnings are timelier, returns will have a stronger association with current earnings and a 
weaker association with future earnings (EKSZ, 2005). Therefore, we control for earnings 
growth, earnings persistence, timeliness of earnings, variability of earnings and information 
environment of the firm. We use market-to-book ratio (MKT2BK) to proxy for the earnings 
growth. Following EKSZ (2005), we use a dummy variable, LOSS, to proxy for earnings 
persistence. LOSS equals 1 if next-year earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. Future positive 
earnings are more predictable and are likely to be more persistent than future negative 
earnings. Based on EKSZ (2005) and Basu (1997), we control for timeliness of earnings, 
using a dummy variable for the SIGN of the current period returns. SIGN equals 1 for 
negative returns and 0 otherwise. Variability of earnings affects the predictability of earnings. 
We control for earnings variability using a dummy variable EARN_VAR, that equals 1 if the 
standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) (scaled by total assets) over 
the preceding five years is above our sample median, and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we control for 
information environment of the firm using SIZE of the firm measured as the natural log of the 
total market capitalization at the end of each year. Specifically, we estimate equation (5) for 
each control variable (CTRL): 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽2(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗  𝐸𝑡−1) 
     + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗  𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) +            𝛽5(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝛾1(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿) +
     𝛾2(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿 ∗  𝐸𝑡−1) + 𝛾3(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛾4(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) +
 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                             (5) 
 
where CTRL equals the control variables and other variables are as defined earlier. We 
estimate equation (5) five times, each time with one of the five control variables.    
The results of estimation are reported in Table 7. We find that earnings persistence firm 
size (SIZE) significantly influences coefficients on past, current and future earnings. 
Timeliness of earnings as measured by SIGN significantly influences coefficient on both past 
and current earnings. Earnings persistence (LOSS) significantly influences coefficients on 
current and future earnings while firm growth (MKT2BK) only influences the coefficient on 
future earnings. The coefficient on future returns is significantly influenced by earnings 
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persistence (LOSS), timeliness of earnings (SIGN) and earnings variability (EARN_VAR). 
Nonetheless, the coefficient on DUAL*Et+1 remains significantly negative for all models 
further emphasizing our main results that the predictability of future earnings, as indicated by 
future ERC, is decreasing in dual class ownership. Similarly, the coefficient on DUAL*Et-1 
also remains significantly positive for models with MKT2BK, SIGN and SIZE as control 
variables indicating that ERC on past earnings is decreasing in dual class ownership. Overall, 
we find that the predictability of future earnings is decreasing in dual class ownership 
structure owing to greater agency costs.  
6.  Conclusion 
On one hand, dual class firms have been found to report accruals of higher quality than 
single class firms, but on the other, dual class firms are perceived to have greater agency 
costs.  Given these conflicting characteristics, we examine the effect of ownership structure 
on a firm’s annual stock returns.  In particular, we seek to determine the relative influence of 
agency costs vis-à-vis accrual quality in investors’ valuation of common stock.  We analyze 
the relationship between 1-year prior, current, and 1-year post earnings on annual stock 
returns of dual class firms vis-à-vis their single class counterparts.   
We find that ERCs of past, current and future earnings are decreasing in the dual class 
ownership. Even after controlling for firm characteristics, we find that future ERC is 
decreasing in dual class ownership. In sum, our results indicate that the dual class ownership 
structure has a mitigating effect on the informativeness of a firm’s earnings.  Hence, we 
conclude that investors weigh the negative effect of agency conflict more heavily than the 
positive effect of higher accrual quality when valuing the stock of a dual class firm. However, 
we would caution the readers in generalizing these finding for single class firms.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 





Number of observations available from CRSP-
COMPUSTAT merged database for fiscal years 
1994-2002 
 15,360 92,240 
Less: Observations with Et-1, Et, Et+1, Rt, or Rt+1 data 
missinga 
 (5,855) (43,055) 
Less: Extreme observations truncated at 1% and 99% 
for Et-1, Et, Et+1, Rt, or Rt+1 
 (316) (3,771) 
Final Sample  9,189c 45,414 
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                             Dual-class firm Observations  448 3,075 
                             Single-class firm Observations  7,728 42,340 
 
a Current returns are regressed on prior earnings, current earnings, future earnings, and future returns 
for the period 1994-2002. So, earnings and return data are required for 2003 to estimate the models for 
the year 2002. Additionally, 1993 earnings are required for Et-1 to estimate models for 1994.  
b We use Compustat annual data item “AQC” and “DO” to determine the firms that experienced 
structural changes following Ettredge, Kwon, Smith and Zarowin (2005). 
c Total number of firms in final sample is not equal to sum of dual class firms and single class firms 
because some of the dual class firms in the overall sample may have unified their shares into single 
class or alternatively, some single class firms may have restructured into dual classes of stock during 
the sample period. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Dual-class Firms 
Variablesa  Mean Median Min. Max. Std.Error 
Rt  0.0795
*  0.0000 -0.8576 3.3333 0.0126 
Et-1  0.0333
*** 0.0696 -1.1159 0.3464 0.0042 
Et  0.0333
*** 0.0696 -1.0243 0.4304 0.0048 
Et+1  0.0393
*** 0.0722 -1.0870 0.5823 0.0053 
Rt+1  0.1205
*** 0.0351 -0.8760 3.6488 0.0134 
SIZE  5.3227*** 5.3565 0.2280 11.5743 0.0447 
MKT2BOOK  2.7280*** 1.5812 0.0990 115.8362 0.1273 
WEDGE  0.2293 0.2159 -0.3077 0.9716 0.0050 
Panel B: Single-class Firms 
Variablesa  Mean Median Min. Max. Std. 
Error 
Rt  0.1012 0.0250 -0.8619 3.4516 0.0033 
Et-1  0.0035 0.0446 -1.1180 0.3446 0.0009 
Et  0.0104 0.0514 -1.1196 0.4297 0.0009 
Et+1  0.0174 0.0534 -1.1169 0.5864 0.0010 
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Rt+1  0.1738 0.0776 -0.8797 4.0300 0.0038 
SIZE  4.8156 4.5989 -1.6490 13.2988 0.0115 
MKT2BOOK  4.9053 1.7110 0.0231 10473.9600 0.5450 
WEDGE  N/A     
*, **, *** Mean of dual class firms is significantly different from mean of single class firms at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
a See Exhibit 1 for variable definitions. 
 
TABLE 3 
Regression Results for Equation (1) 
            𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 +
 𝜀𝑡                                                         (1)  












































































 30,861 1,685 29,176 6,894 23,967 
Adjusted-R2  8.65% 5.66% 8.94% 4.12% 12.20% 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
aSmall firms have revenue of less than $20 million while large firms have revenue of at least $20 
million in a sample year. 
bp-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix. 
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Regression Results for Equation (2) and (3) 
 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 +
𝜀𝑡                                                (2)  
 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽2(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗  𝐸𝑡−1)  
          + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) + 𝛽5(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) +


















































































































































Adjusted-R2  8.66% 8.79% 4.11% 4.15% 12.24% 12.62% 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
aSmall firms have revenue of less than $20 million while large firms have revenue of at least $20 
million in a sample year. 
bp-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix. 
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Regression Results for Equation (4) 
 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 +  𝛽2(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗
 𝐸𝑡−1)                + 𝛽3(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗  𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) + 𝛽5(𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐺𝐸 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) +
𝜀𝑡                            (4)  
 
Variable  Predicted 
Sign 
All Firms Dual-Class 
Firms 


















































  30,814 1,638 
Adjusted-R2   8.70% 5.93% 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 





Regression Results for Equation (5) using dual-class firms sample 
 
    𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽0𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 +  𝛽1(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗
 𝐸𝑡−1) +               𝛽2(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑉𝑂𝑇𝐸 ∗ 𝑅𝑡+1) +
 𝛾0𝐼𝐶𝐹 + 𝛾1(𝐼𝐶𝐹 ∗              𝐸𝑡−1) + 𝛾2(𝐼𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛾3(𝐼𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) +
𝜀𝑡                                                                           (5)  
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 1638 1638 1638 
Adjusted-R2  6.00% 5.77% 6.03% 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
ap-values are based on White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent variance 
covariance matrix. 




Regression results for Equation (6) using all firms sample 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝛼2𝐸𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝑡+1 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽2(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗  𝐸𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗ 𝐸𝑡+1) +
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Variable  Definition 
Rit  is the buy-and-hold returns for the year t, measured over the12-month period 
starting three months after year t-1 fiscal year-end using the monthly share price 
data adjusted for the dividends. 
Eit  is the income before extraordinary items available to common shareholders 
(Compustat annual item “IBCOM”) in year t, scaled by market value of equity 
three months after year t-1 fiscal year-end; where market value of equity = 
(closing price x  number of shares outstanding) is determined using CRSP 
monthly stock data.  
Ei,t-1  is the income before extraordinary items available to common shareholders in 
the year preceding year t, scaled by market value of equity three months after 
year t-1 fiscal year-end. 
Ei,t+1  is the income before extraordinary items available to common shareholders in 
the year following year t, scaled by market value of equity three months after 
year t-1 fiscal year-end. 
Ri,t+1  is the buy-and-hold returns for the year t+1, measured over the12-month period 
starting three months after year t fiscal year-end using the monthly share price 
data adjusted for the dividends. 
DUAL  = 1 if dual class firm; else = 0. 
WEDGE  Difference between percentage of voting rights (IVOTE) and percentage of cash 
flow rights (ICF) controlled by insiders. A measure of excess control rights of 
the insiders. 
IVOTE  Total percentage of firm’s voting rights controlled by insiders (officers and 
directors) across classes. 
ICF  Total percentage of firm’s cash flow rights controlled by insiders. 
SIZE  is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal 
year, i.e., = log(Compustat annual item “PRCC” x Compustat annual item 
“CSHO”) 
MKT2BK  is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of common equity at the end 
of fiscal year; where book value of equity is Compustat annual item “CEQ”. 
 
 
 
 
